The Failure of RFRA by Lupu, Ira C.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 20 Issue 3 Article 2 
1998 
The Failure of RFRA 
Ira C. Lupu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Religion Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 575 (1998). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol20/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
THE FAILURE OF RFRA
Ira C. Lupu*
With the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993' (RFRA) all but
dead, the time has come to conduct a dispassionate analysis of how and why
the Act failed. Indeed, careful lawyers committed to a robust version of
religious liberty stand to learn a great deal from RFRA's brief, unhappy life.
Efforts are afoot, in both state and federal lawmaking circles, to find alternative
mechanisms to achieve RFRA's goals. These efforts include amendments to
the U.S. Constitution, revisions of the federal RFRA to enable it to withstand
federal constitutional attack,2 and state legislation designed to achieve RFRA's
purposes within particular states.' If the proponents of these measures do not
understand the RFRA experience, they are doomed to repeat many of the
past's mistakes.
RFRA failed in many respects. First, the constitutional planning behind
it was inadequate. Its proponents concentrated their energies too narrowly and
* Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of Law. The George Washington University
Law School. Thanks to Tom Dienes, Mike Selmi, Bob Tuttle, and the participants in the George
Washington Law School faculty workshop for helpful comments on an earlier version of this
essay, and to Julia Morgan for excellent research assistance in its preparation.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was designed
to overcome the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Act applied
to all levels of government in the U.S. and provided, in pertinent part:
SECTION 1. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED.
(a) IN GENERAL. - Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) EXCEPTION. - Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
Id. at § 2000bb-I. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), invalidated RFRA as
applied to the states, and there remains reason for doubt as to its validity against the federal
government. For my view of the Court's opinion, see Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was
Wrong and the Court Was Right--Reflections on City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 39 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 789 (forthcoming 1998).
2. See, e.g., Protecting Religious Freedom after Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, (July 14, 1997), available
in <http://www.house.gov/judiciary>.
3. The California Assembly recently passed a state-level RFRA. See Larry B. Stammer,
Bill Would Implement State Version ofFederal Act, LOS ANGELES TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1997, Metro,
at B4. New Jersey is considering similar legislation. See David Gibson & Dunstan McNichol,
Both Parties Offer Bills to Extend Religious Rights, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Sept.
18, 1997, at A3.
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shortsightedly on hinging RFRA to the Fourteenth Amendment, section five,4
when danger signs concerning that path were all about. A constitutional
strategy that diversified the underpinnings of RFRA was available and far
preferable to what was used; stools always stand better on three or more legs
than on one. Yet the proponents of RFRA ignored the need for a well-balanced
approach, and members of Congress did not demonstrate enough interest or
insight to compensate for the overly narrow view of the interest groups which
supported the Act.
Second, RFRA failed as a matter of constitutional discourse. The debate
and deliberation one might have expected to surround such a sweeping and
unprecedented enactment never occurred. One major reason for the lack of
such a conversation about RFRA was the reluctance of states and localities to
oppose it, and the apparent indifference of members of Congress to the Act's
consequences for administration of state and local government. Had issue been
joined in a timely and vigorous way about the likely costs and benefits of
RFRA, it would never have emerged in the form it took.
Because of these failures of planning and process, RFRA became law in
a way which created a substantial likelihood of judicial evisceration of its
goals. The primary dredging tool employed by courts in that project was
RFRA's requirement that religion be "substantially burden[ed]"5 for RFRA's
protections to come into play. In addition, cotirts found more subtle devices
with which to undercut the Act's seeming rigors. Nor did regulators or other
government policy makers fill the breach; unless directly confronted with a
RFRA challenge, these decision makers tended to ignore the Act. As a result,
after three and one-half years, RFRA had accomplished little. At the level of
policy achievement, RFRA was a disappointment.
In what follows, I assess these phenomena. Part I analyzes the constitu-
tional deficiencies in the way RFRA took shape, and Part H1 assesses the
patterns of RFRA decisions by various legal actors. In Part Im, I offer some
thoughts as to the lessons of RFRA, what they suggest about the unique
problems of protecting religious liberty, and where advocates of such
protection might go from here. In particular, I argue that legislative codifica-
tion of religious liberty, RFRA-style, is ill-advised, and that courts should be
permitted a period in which to work through their own, levelheaded "restora-
tion" of religious liberty.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §5.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994).
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I. RFRA As CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE
RFRA's political sponsors and drafters faced a dilemma. They under-
stood from the outset that simplicity was a virtue. In order to create and
maintain a coalition of many different religious groups and civil liberties
interests, many of which disagreed strenuously on a variety of other issues,
they had to find a simple, all-encompassing formula for statutory protection of
religious liberty. As others have emphasized,6 RFRA itself had to be generally
applicable, protecting religious practice by legal formula which on its face
favored or disfavored no particular sect. If any mainstream religious group felt
excluded, the political coalition supporting the Act would have unraveled. 7 If
any particular government function, such as public schools or prisons, were
exempted, other government agencies would have rushed to argue that they too
deserved exemption. Hence, RFRA was drafted in a way that made it
constitution-like in its coverage, protecting all who came within its general
formulation, and burdening all government.'
As sensible as this drafting and political strategy may have been, it does
not justify constitutional myopia. Even if RFRA supporters were committed,
for reasons of both principle and politics, to the most general formula,
uncluttered by exemptions or special treatment for any religious group or
government function, they nevertheless might have suggested multiple possible
constitutional bases for the Act. The Commerce Power and the Spending
Power were prominent among the possibilities. Indeed, while the Act was
under consideration in the House, I explicitly recommended to a subcommittee
of that body that these sources of power be considered as additional or
alternative bases for RFRA as applied to the States. 9 Neither was ironclad at
6. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock and Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REv. 209 (1994).
7. The issue o f abortion almost caused such an unraveling. See text accompanying
footnotes 35-40 infra.
8. The political dynamics which explain the need for such statutory generality, coupled
with delegation to others of the decision making particulars, are not difficult to understand.
After all, could freedom of speech, as currently defined and protected by courts, survive a
political referendum in which each of its applications was scrutinized and made subject to a
discrete political decision? How many votes would there be, for example, for a legislative
proposal to codify the three-part obscenity test of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)?
9. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong. 385-87 (1992) (hereinafter House RFRA Hearings) (statement of Professor Ira C. Lupu).
A scholar has recently suggested that RFRA might rest on the Treaty Power, see Gerald I.
Neuman, The Global Dimension ofRFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 33 (1997) (arguing that
RFRA is a statutory application to the states of the international human rights commitments of
the federal government), but I do not believe that anyone called that to the attention of Congress
at the time. Perhaps a basis of congressional power that involves Congress in implementing
1998] ,
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the time, and the Commerce Power is a more tenuous source today than it was
then, because of the Court's subsequent decisions in Lopez,10 limiting the
power's ambit, and Printz," which protects states against being commandeered
under any Article I power. Yet, as RFRA's rehabilitators have recently
argued, 12 both the Commerce Power and the Spending Power remain plausible
candidates for the source of some reenacted version of RFRA.
Moreover, the legislative history shows absolutely no attention to the
problem of justifying RFRA's coverage of the federal government. The Act
itself explicitly so applies, 3 but nothing within it or in its accompanying
materials explains the basis for that application. Of course, Congress is under
no obligation to identify its power source in imposing RFRA on otherwise
valid federal schemes. Congress has authority (up to the limits of the
Establishment Clause) to modify any federal program with respect to matters
of religious liberty. Nevertheless, it was symptomatic of the strategy of RFRA
supporters that the question of RFRA's constitutionality as applied to the
federal government was never a matter of explicit focus.
Rather, RFRA's supporters rested the case for congressional power to
enact RFRA entirely and exclusively on Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Despite this narrowness of approach, judicial restraint perhaps
should have led the Court in Boerne to presume that Congress meant to rest
RFRA on any source that fit. Such a posture would have at least brought the
Commerce Power back into the picture.14 Indeed, in historic preservation cases
foreign relations decisions cannot be invoked by courts through operation of the general
presumption of constitutionality and the deference to Congress which the presumption supports.
Congress not having explicitly invoked the Treaty Power when it enacted RFRA, the Court in
Boerne may have acted quite appropriately in not considering whether to invoke the power on
Congress's behalf.
10. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that Commerce Clause does
not extend to prohibition on handgun possession in a school zone).
11. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (holding that Congress may not
commandeer state agents to carry out discretionary federal policy goals).
12. See Protecting Religious Freedom after Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, (July 14, 1997) (statement
of Professor Douglas Laycock), available in <http://www.house.gov./judiciary>. For careful
analysis of the Spending Power and Commerce Power as possible bases for a new version of
RFRA, see Daniel Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores:
The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local
Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LITMLE ROCK L. J. 633, pt. 11 (1998).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (1994).
14. Whatever may be the case with respect to the Treaty Power, see supra note 9, the
Spending Power must be unambiguously invoked, so that states know what conditions attach
to federal grants and know what financial risks they take if they ignore federal law
requirements. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). So the
Court in Boerne could not have presumed that RFRA was an exercise of conditional spending
by Congress.
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(as Boerne itself was), the Commerce Power may be a plausible source for
RFRA; government restriction on the rehabilitation of worship facilities limits
the development of resources and might have deleterious economic conse-
quences. Nevertheless, it was foolhardy for RFRA's proponents to depend
upon the Court's sua sponte invocation of the Commerce Power if and when
an appropriate RFRA case arose. Congress announced explicitly what it
thought it was doing, and the Court quite understandably took Congress at its
word.
The contrast between the legislative/constitutional strategy pursued by
RFRA's supporters and that pursued by other, innovative civil rights crusaders
is illuminating. In the early 1960's, when Congress considered the landmark
Civil Rights Act of 1964, I" constitutional considerations were a centerpiece of
the effort. Some proponents of the law wanted to rest the public accommoda-
tions provisions upon Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment; others quite
rightly recognized that Supreme Court precedent explicitly limited Congressio-
nal power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause to action taken under state
rather than private authority. 6 Accordingly, the Act's designers developed a
Commerce Power rationale, and a statutory coverage formula that fit that
rationale, to support those public accommodations provisions. 7 Moreover,
they introduced evidence in Congress that racial discrimination in hotels and
restaurants impeded interstate movement by African-Americans."8 This
formula, the evidence in support of a Commerce Power theory of the Act, and
the deliberation Congress gave to the constitutional question of the scope of its
own power, all proved influential in the Supreme Court's ultimate validation
of the public accommodations provisions of the Act.' 9
More recently, the proponents of the federal Violence Against Women
Ace (VAWA) demonstrated similar constitutional resourcefulness in the
political struggles to enact the scheme. One major provision of the Act makes
it unlawful to travel across a state line with the intent to injure a spouse or
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-362, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
16. See G. GUNTHER & K. SULLIVAN, CONSTITU'TONAL LAW 201-02 (13th ed. 1997)
(reviewing contending positions).
17. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title II, § 201, 78 Stat. 241.
18. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. (78 Stat. 241)
2391, 2493-2501.
19. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding application of the Act
to a restaurant which obtained a substantial portion of its food supply through interstate
commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding on
Commerce Power grounds application of the act to hotels and motels).
20. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902
(1994). The Act is part of the larger Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.1797 (1994).
1998]
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intimate partner and, in the course of or as a result of that travel, to "intention-
ally commit[ ] a crime of violence and thereby cause[ ] bodily injury to such
spouse or intimate partner ... ,, This provision, the constitutionality of
which has been upheld in the lower courts, 22 rests entirely on the Commerce
Power. Here, VAWA's drafters took pains to include a carefully drafted
jurisdictional hook to commerce - travel across a state line with an illicit
purpose - and at least some legislative history focused upon the inadequacy of
state and local government to deal with the problem of interstate domestic
violence.23
The Act's more constitutionally controversial provision is that which
creates a federal civil action, for damages and other appropriate relief, against
"a person ... who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender ....
This provision lacks the jurisdictional predicate of the state line crossing
required under the criminal provision, and lower courts have divided on its
constitutionality.25  There is evidence that VAWA's proponents fully
appreciated the constitutional doubts such a provision might engender. They
argued that the civil provision could rest on the Commerce Power, because of
the cumulative economic consequences of domestic violence, including lost
productivity and the costs of health care required to treat injuries inflicted in
such violence. 26 They contended as well that Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment could support this provision.27 As was the case with the 1964
Civil Rights Act, the problem in this regard is state action, or its absence.
VAWA's proponents were able to make out a credible legislative case that
state and local law enforcement officers were historically lax in investigating
or prosecuting crimes of domestic violence.28 This showing, whether or not
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (1994).
22. See United States v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
23. See id. at 87. The district court in Gluzman described this history as sparse, but the
jurisdictional hook in this provision of VAWA makes the necessity for legislative fact-finding
on the subject relatively unimportant. See id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
25. Compare Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding the provision)
with Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996)
(holding the provision unconstitutional) rev'd 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding the
provision based on the Commerce Power).
26. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 612-15. The case for upholding this provision is stronger
than was the case in Lopez, because the VAWA provision focuses on actual violence and its
costs, not merely the potential for violence and disruption associated with handgun possession.
See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 964-74 (distinguishing Lopez).
27. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 793. The Court of Appeals in Brzonkala did not reach
this question. See id. at 964 n.8.
28. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 793.
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ultimately successful, tied the provision to portions of the Ku Klux Klan Act
which the Court had been willing to uphold on a related theory.29
Finally, VAWA's supporters argued that congressional power to enforce
the Thirteenth Amendment - not limited to state action in its prohibition of
slavery - also justified the civil damages provision. 0 Without question,
extending the Thirteenth Amendment to concerns of gender relations will not
be easily accepted by courts;3 nevertheless, it is certainly a plausible argument
that violent spouses attempt to keep their mates in a form of physical and
emotional bondage, and that Congress would therefore have a rational basis for
finding domestic- violence to be an instrument of domination analogous to
enslavement.3
Thus, in a situation in which the constitutionality of coercive federal
intervention into historically local matters was certain to be challenged,
VAWA's designers took great pains to establish a record showing the
consideration and credibility of a variety of sources of congressional power for
the scheme. By contrast, RFRA's proponents put all of their eggs in a
constitutional basket of highly questionable and uncertain strength. Moreover,
they did so in connection with a proposed enactment which threw back to the
judiciary an assignment which the Supreme Court in Employment Division v.
Smith had explicitly rejected as a matter of constitutional law. In such
circumstances, judicial resistance to RFRA was certainly to be expected.
Why did RFRA's supporters not carefully consider and diversify their
constitutional portfolio? I have not put this question directly to RFRA's
architects, but my experience with RFRA suggests a number of possible
explanations.
First, RFRA as originally conceived would have been explicitly more
limiting of the states than of the federal government.33 I believe it is symptom-
29. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (holding that alleged criminal
conspiracy between state officers and private persons sufficient to support federal authority
under the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (ruling that
allegations that private persons made false reports to police, as part of a conspiracy to violate
civil rights, constitute sufficient state action to support federal authority).
30. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (1991).
31. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 796 n.3.
32. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,(1968) (holding that Congress had
a rational basis to outlaw private racial discrimination in housing as a vestige of slavery). For
a creative effort at extending the arnbit of the Thirteenth Amendment to matters of intra family
domination, see Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth
Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1359 (1992).
33. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-2797, § 6(b) explicitly recognizing the authority of federal
lawmakers - presumably including agencies as well as Congress - to exempt law from RFRA
by explicitly so stating. RFRA as ultimately enacted does not permit federal agencies to so opt
out of coverage, though future Congresses of course can limit RFRA's effect against the federal
government.
1998]
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atic of Washington politics - RFRA's story was inside the Beltway if ever one
was - in the late twentieth century that Congress is relatively unmindful of the
administrative interests of the states except to the extent those interests are
likely to increase demand for federal subsidies. Even when RFRA was
redrafted to make its coverage of the federal government less easy to evade,
members of Congress may have remained ambivalent about covering federal
law and administration. It would thus be in their institutional interest as
protectors of the federal government and bureaucracy to make explicit in
RFRA a source of power over state and local administration, while identifying
no such source of power to impose RFRA upon federal administration.
Second, and I believe closer to the central truth, RFRA was defined by the
concerns and focus of its opposition. The early resistance to RFRA was one-
dimensional - the issue was abortion. When RFRA was originally introduced
in 1990, George Bush was President and opponents of abortion believed they
had an excellent opportunity to achieve their long-desired goal of having the
Supreme Court overrule Roe v. Wade.3 In 1990, the Supreme Court included
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor, all of
whom had expressed dissatisfaction with Roe.35 By 1992, President Bush had
appointed David Souter to replace Justice Brennan and Clarence Thomas to
replace Justice Marshall. Hence, abortion foes believed Roe was headed for
history's trash compactor.
For reasons that remain obscure, a number of leaders in the anti-abortion
movement became concerned that RFRA might become the source of a legal
right to an abortion. The grounds for such concern were never very persuasive;
few women could credibly claim that their religion motivated them to have an
abortion, and far fewer still could claim that their religion compelled them to
have an abortion. Of this second group - those with a credible claim of
religious compulsion - most or all would be in the situation of having life-
threatening pregnancies,3 6 and hence would be free to abort under whatever
state law would exist on the subject. Despite the inherent implausibility of the
argument that RFRA would turn out to be a substitute for Roe, a number of
anti-abortion members of Congress, and a number of religious interests
(including the Catholic Conference of the United States) remained opposed to
RFRA.Y At this stage of RFRA's gestation, it was its impact on abortion
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (plurality).
36. See House RFRA Hearings, supra note 9, at 119 (statement of Rep. Solarz that
Orthodox Judaism is the only religion in the U.S. which requires abortion in any circumstance,
and that that circumstance is a pregnancy which endangers the life of the pregnant woman).
37. See House RFRA Hearings, supra note 9, at 39-43 (statement of Mark Chopko,
General Counsel, U.S. Catholic Conference); see also House RFRA Hearings, supra note 9, at
139 (statement of Hon. Christopher M. Smith, R-NJ).
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rights, not seemingly abstract questions about its constitutionality, that
monopolized the political debate. RFRA's supporters who favored Roe would
not agree to support a RFRA with abortion excluded, and RFRA's potential
supporters who opposed Roe would not support RFRA without such an
exclusion.
When the abortion issue collapsed, as it did in 1992 after the Supreme
Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey8 and the election of Bill
Clinton, the opposition to RFRA among religious groups disappeared with it.39
Convinced that Roe would remain vital for a long time to come (and that
RFRA would therefore play no part in the creation of abortion rights), the anti-
abortion members of Congress and religious groups leaped aboard the RFRA
bandwagon. With that issue gone, one would have expected the next and
obvious set of political opponents - state and local governments and their
administrators - to appear and to raise constitutional as well as policy
objections to RFRA. Had a vigorous attack on congressional power to regulate
state treatment of religious exemption claims been mounted there and then,
perhaps RFRA's supporters would have been moved to expand and rethink
their constitutional strategy.
With few exceptions, however, these potential sources of opposition were
silent. The National League of Cities, the National Governors' Association, the
National Associations of Attorneys General - in short, all of the Washington-
based organizations one would expect to appear and to state their concerns
about the impact of RFRA on their operations - were nowhere to be seen. The
National School Board Association did express some concern about the impact
of RFRA on public school administration, ° and requested some drafting
changes in the Act's text. And, shortly before RFRA's enactment in 1993, a
group of state attorneys general and prison administrators attempted to obtain
a generic exemption of prisons from RFRA's coverage. Their efforts, backed
by Senators Simpson and Reid, proved too little and too late; the Senate
rejected by a narrow margin a prison exemption from RFRA, and RFRA then
passed both Houses by overwhelming majorities."
Why state and local officials did not oppose RFRA sooner and more
vigorously, or at least make known their appraisals of the costs RFRA would
impose on them, is worth pondering. The most likely reason, by my guess,
38. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
39. Professor Laycock, an insider throughout the process of RFRA's creation and defense,
confirms this view. See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 883, 896 (1994).
40. For further detail, see Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyers Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 171, 188 n.74.
41. See id. at 191; see also Laycock, supra note 39, at 896.
19981
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was that elected state and local officials feared that opposition to RFRA would
be politically costly. All these officials have religious institutions within their
jurisdiction, and a great many of these institutions had national affiliates
involved in the RFRA campaign. Religious liberty in the abstract is always
popular, and opposing it in the abstract is rarely so. Accordingly, state and
local government officials may well have been afraid to speak their mind about
the costs of RFRA.
This particular kind of process failure - a relevant set of political interests
silenced by their leaders' fear of political repercussions - may well have been
aggravated by RFRA's vagueness. As the next section of this paper explores,
the Act's key terms were redolent with ambiguity. Most concerned representa-
tives of state and local government may thus have believed that the Act would
be construed so as to not impose significant costs on their operations. Perhaps
prison administrators finally were able to break through the silence because 1)
religious liberty for prisoners is not very popular, 2) the pre-RFRA constitu-
tional law regarding religious liberty in prisons was extremely favorable to
government,42 and 3) correction officials knew full well of the onslaught of
litigation they would face under virtually any interpretation of RFRA.
In any event, the RFRA story surely seems to be one in which the political
safeguards of federalism43 failed; the states and localities proved poorly
equipped to protect their interests in Congress. In the absence of advocacy
from that quarter, the constitutional and policy debate in Congress was one-
sided and RFRA's proponents never had to face and respond to, in the
legislative arena, the strongest possible anti-RFRA arguments. By the time
those appeared in briefs to the Supreme Court, it was too late for RFRA's
proponents to cover the constitutional bases adequately.
In addition to this ironic lesson about the potential legal costs of political
nonadversity, the story of RFRA's enactment suggests still another insight
about the weakness of the political safeguards of federalism. Even if state and
local officials did not show up to oppose RFRA, might not members of
Congress themselves have noticed and been concerned about the infliction of
costs upon the States? The possibility was there, but the experience was to the
contrary. Other than the concern from Senator Simpson about the effect of
RFRA upon the administration of prisons," nary a voice was heard in the halls
42. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
43. The phrase is from Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism - The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
L. REv. 543 (1954). The most energetic contemporary elaboration of the Wechsler thesis is to
be found in JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLInCAL PROCESS (1980).
Needless to say, the Court has not been listening of late to Professors Wechsler and Choper.
44. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 18-38 (1993).
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of Congress expressing concern for the impact of RFRA on the states. The
expectations of scholars that members of Congress would be aware of and
sensitive to the effects of federal enactment upon their districts, including
processes of state and local government, are simply not borne out by the RFRA
story. Perhaps the Act's substance was so appealing that it overwhelmed
considerations of federalism, even for those members of Congress who purport
to believe deeply in keeping the federal government out of local affairs.
If substance conquers the principle of federalism whenever majorities of
both Houses feel strongly about the matter, however, the political safeguards
of federalism will chronically fail. As Marci Hamilton so aptly suggested soon
after RFRA's enactment, those who expect the fox to guard the henhouse seem
destined for repeated disappointment."
I. RFRA's RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT
Whether or not RFRA's constitutionality might have been saved, at least
in part, through better planning, RFRA did not prove to be the guarantor of
religious liberty its proponents promised. Indeed, in the wake of Boerne,
RFRA's principal defenders were both outspoken on the tragic quality of the
Supreme Court's decision and marvelously muted on the particulars of what
RFRA had accomplished.6 A close look at RFRA's record, which this part
undertakes, shows that RFRA failed to produce any substantial improvement
in the legal atmosphere surrounding religious liberty in the United States.
RFRA's most significant impact has been in prison, and even there RFRA
probably did not create any dramatic alteration in the climate of relations
between inmates and administrators on matters of religious liberty.47
Moreover, the benefits obtained through RFRA victories in prison have to be
weighed against the frequency and cost of defending against RFRA prison
litigation. However incommensurable these costs and benefits may be, strong
claims that RFRA earned its keep in prison are hard to justify.
Outside of prison, the record is not much better. The cases are distributed
among various legal contexts, and the costs of defending against RFRA claims
are distributed accordingly. To be sure, a few of those cases represent
normatively significant victories for religion; keeping open church centers for
45. See Marci Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox Into
the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REv.
357 (1995).
46. Virtually every pro-RFRA statement at the post-Boeme House Subcommittee Hearings
is evidence of this. See Hearings supra note 2.
47. See generally Daniel Solove, Faith Profaned. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459 (1996) (arguing that RFRA has failed to protect
the religious needs of prisoners).
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feeding the poor4' and preserving the inviolability of Catholic confession 49 are
noteworthy indeed. But the overall record of RFRA successes is slim, and at
least some of those victories represent highly questionable resolutions of
competing social policies."0 As analyzed in the pages that follow, RFRA's
brief life generated a great deal of work for lawyers and judges, but did not
produce systematic gains for religion.
A. Criteria For Measurement
Without question, one cannot render a meaningful judgment concerning
RFRA's success or failure without criteria by which to measure. If one
believes that a single victory for religious exercise burdened by government
policy is sufficient to justify the costs of RFRA, then the Act has been a
rousing success. If, at the other extreme, one believes that most protections for
religious exercises achieved through RFRA could have been obtained at
considerably lower cost, the Act has been dreadfully wasteful.
My own view is between these poles. Like the First Amendment itself,
RFRA invites weak claims and imposes costs of defense on the government.
If we are to be true to our commitment to civil liberties, this phenomenon is
unavoidable. Accordingly, the measure of RFRA's success must be somewhat
subjective. Appraisal must include sensitive assessment of the gains to religion
and the costs to government which the Act generated, and must as well be
mindful of the difficulty of making comparisons between the intangible
benefits religion may obtain and the economic and other costs which
government must bear. Moreover, the world of RFRA may have been filled
with barely visible benefits, included increased bargaining leverage for
religious interests and an increased feeling of security among the deeply
religious, as well as hard-to-calculate costs, including social resentment over
particular RFRA claims and the civic stresses caused by the necessity to defend
against them. In addition, the project of appraising RFRA is complicated
48. See, e.g., Smart Circle Parish v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.
Va. 1996); Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538
(D.D.C. 1994); Jesus Center v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 544 N.W.2d 698
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
49. See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997) (District Attorney's secret
taping of confession to priest by murder suspect in county jail violated RFRA).
50. See, e.g., Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that RFRA
protects right to wear Sikh warrior daggers, sewn to sheath, in public school); United States v.
Gonzales, 957 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.M. 1997) (ruling that RFRA protects right to kill a bald
eagle to obtain material for use in religious ritual); Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843 (Vt. 1994)
(explaining that RFRA precludes contempt citation for father who refuses on religious grounds
to support child).
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further by the difficulty of determining how many results, in matters in which
claimants raised RFRA issues, might have been identical in its absence.5'
Whatever the appropriate measure of "success' or "failure," it should be
evident from what is reported below that RFRA did not fulfill the expectations
of its sponsors and proponents. From the day of the Supreme Court's decision
in Smith in 1990, lobbyists for religion bewailed the gap in religious liberty
law, and cried out for legislation to fill it.5" The legislation they obtained
purported to return the law of religious liberty to its point of greatest vigor.
However large the chasm between that point and the regime of Smith, RFRA
has done much less to bridge it than its proponents hoped or expected.
B. A Note on Methodology and its Limitations
My research on RFRA is essentially limited to the databases of federal
regulatory actions, opinions of state attorneys general, and reported judicial
decisions. How big the iceberg of which these are the tip is simply unknown
to me. An exhaustive analysis of the effects of RFRA of course would include
regulatory actions under consideration as well as 1) the layer of cases filed in
which no reported opinions had been rendered, 2) cases settled after the
initiation of RFRA litigation, and 3) RFRA matters resolved without resort to
litigation. RFRA may well have added leverage to the claims made in the
name of religious liberty since late 1993, and one cannot be certain that RFRA
was unsuccessful in achieving gains for religious liberty as a result of that
leverage being exercised.53
Moreover, Boerne has reduced, and perhaps signaled the elimination of,
the possibility of Supreme Court construction of RFRA. As this paper will
detail below, some of the failure of RFRA is attributable to government-
favorable constructions of some of its crucial terms. Had the Supreme Court
51. It would be helpful to be able to compare the results of RFRA with those obtained
under other civil rights statutes. Unfortunately, most empirical studies of such results have
focused on win-loss records for cases that go to trial, see, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation
Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L. J. 1567 (1989),
rather than the overall win-loss record for claims filed under a particular statute. And RFRA
was distinctive in being an attempt to restore constitutional rights, rather than to create wholly
new statutory ones. One might expect a true restoration to have a very high record of success
in the courts and elsewhere.
52. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990) (statements of Rev. John
Buchanan, Rev. Robert P. Dugan, Jr., Rev. Dean M. Kelley, American Jewish Congress, Anti-
Defamation League).
53. The leverage was increased by RFRA's provision for attorney's fees to be paid by
government to lawyers presenting successful RFRA claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c)
(1994).
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upheld the Act as applied to the states and construed it in religion-friendly
ways, the lower court record of RFRA claims would presumably yield a
somewhat different set of results. In addition, Boerne resulted in the termina-
tion of a great deal of RFRA litigation in progress; in some of these cases,
RFRA claims had survived dispositive motions and might ultimately have
prevailed. 4
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons to believe that a survey of
regulatory actions, attorney general opinions explicitly influenced by RFRA,
and reported judicial opinions are useful measures of RFRA's potential.
Regulatory actions and attorney general opinions show the extent to which
public officials have begun to internalize the norm that RFRA attempted to
impose on all of government in the United States.
Litigation results are even more revealing. The Act is sufficiently vague
and elastic that government officials may well have resisted and litigated
against RFRA claims rather than settle them in costly ways. Moreover, the
Supreme Court might well have succumbed to the same pressures lower court
judges experienced in deciding how generously to construe RFRA's operative
language." And, to the extent lower court judges were hostile to RFRA claims
- as I believe they were and are - even relatively generous Supreme Court
construction of RFRA might not have altered significantly the pattern of RFRA
victories and defeats. Because RFRA claimants and government officials
would have been (or, for federal officials for the moment, will be) bargaining
in the shadow of RFRA's gloss rather than RFRA pure, the judicial treatment
of RFRA is the key determinant of RFRA's long-term success.
C. Federal Regulatory Actions and State Attorney General Opinions
Electronic databases make this information readily available. Moreover,
both of these categories reveal something about the quantity of RFRA-
consciousness among public officials, and their early interpretations of the Act.
In fact, the results demonstrate how little religion-protecting impact RFRA had
in either setting.
In the category of federal regulation, one might have expected significant
amounts of RFRA influence. After all, RFRA is federal law, supported by a
near unanimous House and Senate56 and an enthusiastic President. 57 After
54. See, e.g., Hinkle v. Arizona Dep't of Corrections, 50 F.3d 14 (9th Cir. 1995).
55. This is what I predicted in my testimony to the House subcommittee considering
RFRA in 1992. See House RFRA Hearings, supra note 9, at 380-85.
56. See Signing of Religious Freedom Act Culminates 3-year Push, THE WASH. POST,
Nov. 20, 1993 at C6, available in 1993 WL 2087505.
57. See id.
[Vol. 20
THE FAILURE OF RFRA
1993, as Professor Paulsen so aptly put it in Montana, a RFRA ran through the
entire U.S. Code."8
A search of the Federal Register, in which proposed and final rules of
federal agencies must be published in order to have legal effect, reveals how
little the agencies of the federal government paid heed to RFRA. As of
February, 1998, RFRA had been cited in the Federal Register a grand total of
ten times. One of the ten was a general reference in a Presidential Proclama-
tion announcing Religious Freedom Day.59 Three of the ten were laundry list
references to RFRA in regulations concerning agency proceedings governed
by the Equal Access to Justice Act.60
The remaining six concerned possible substantive impacts of RFRA. Two
involved outright denials of relief requested under RFRA. 6' The remaining
four (three of which involved federal policy toward Native Americans) made
reference to RFRA, but not a single one suggested that the existence of RFRA
had altered federal policy in the slightest degree. 62 To put the matter bluntly,
there is absolutely no evidence that RFRA did anything to protect religion in
decision making by the agencies of the United States.
The state attorney general opinions, typically triggered by formal requests
from state legislators, offer little more. As of early September, 1997, eleven
AG opinions had cited RFRA. In only two did an Attorney General decide that
58. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the
U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REv. 249 (1995).
59. See Proclamation No. 6646, 59 Fed. Reg. 2925 (1994).
60. See 62 Fed. Reg. 19233 (1997) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 6); 61 Fed. Reg. 28831
(1996) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 6); 60 Fed. Reg. 12668 (1995) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 1262).
61. See 62 Fed. Reg. 4890 (1997) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 543 & 553) (RFRA
adds nothing to right of federal prison inmates to give one another legal advice or materials);
60 Fed. Reg. 45258 (1995) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 251 & 261) (requiring a permit for
distribution of religious materials in the public forests is not a substantial burden within the
meaning of RFRA).
62. See 62 Fed. Reg. 26909 (1997) (announcing FAA consultation with Indian tribes on
effect upon sacred sites of proposed Grand Canyon overflight air routes); 61 Fed. Reg. 41424
(1996) (announcing policy toward climbing Devil's Tower National Monument and referencing
an Executive Order which "supplements" RFRA); 61 Fed. Reg. 29424 (1996) (discussing
federal policy on tribal sovereignty and making passing reference to RFRA); 60 Fed. Reg.
66491 (1995) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 2301) (announcing new policy towards
telecommunications services in cases involving sectarian transmissions; policy remarks on
commenter Fordham University's reference to RFRA, but policy rests on revised Establishment
Clause interpretation). The recently promulgated guidelines on religious speech in the federal
workplace also refer to RFRA but do not depend upon it; i.e., these rules would have been
promulgated in identical fashion in RFRA's absence, and will survive any invalidation of
RFRA as applied to the federal government. See Memorandum on Religious Exercise and
Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace, 33 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1246 (Aug. 14,
1997); see also Peter Baker, Workplace Religion Policy Due; Clinton Plans to Issue Executive
Guidelines for Federal Employees, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1997, at A-0 1.
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RFRA required an exemption from state law of general applicability. In
Nebraska, the Attorney General concluded that RFRA required an exemption
from a law against bonfires for Native Americans who made fires as part of a
sweat lodge ceremony.63 And, in a carefully reasoned Maryland opinion on
historic preservation, that state's Attorney General suggested that RFRA
compelled an exemption for religious structures from preservation orders
concerning elements of buildings "grounded in religious belief and practice."'
In another opinion, the Maryland Attorney General indicated that RFRA
reinforced a recommendation that would have been reached on federal and state
constitutional grounds alone.65- Four opinions, three of which concerned
religious speech by students on public school premises, made reference to
RFRA without indicating its legal significance in the context addressed.66 Four
other attorney general opinions, in widely disparate contexts, denied outright
the possibility that RFRA would produce any relief for religious exercise in the
circumstances covered by the opinion.67
The volume of state attorney general opinions is not surprising. Here too,
of course, there may have been more in the works at the time of Boerne. As
was the case with respect to federal regulation, however, decisions giving
RFRA dispositive religion-protective weight are rare. If Smith created a legal
gap, RFRA did little to fill it in this context.
D. Results of RFRA Litigation
The information which follows in this section was obtained from
searching in the Westlaw and Lexis databases for reported cases which mention
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Prior to Boerne, the federal and state
courts combined had produced 168 RFRA decisions (excluding decisions
63. See Op. Att'y Gen. 94049 (Neb. 1994).
64. See 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 94-037 (Md. 1994). The opinion declares that the Maryland
constitution tracks the federal constitution on matters of religious liberty, and that the federal
constitution has been effectively revised by RFRA. See id. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Boerne of course repudiates the latter point.
65. See Op. Att'y Gen. 93-050 (Md. 1993) (noting First Amendment to U.S. Constitution
and RFRA both may protect student distribution of religious literature and wearing of religious
symbols on school property).
66. See 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 95-07 1995 (N.D. 1995) (discussing public payment for
cremation but not burial of indigents); Op. Att'y Gen. 97-083 (Tenn. 1997) (discussing student
religious liberty); Op. Att'y Gen. 97-079 (Tenn. 1997); and Op. Att'y Gen. 3 (Wash. 1995).
67. See Op. Att'y Gen. 94-104 (Ark. 1994) (advising RFRA does not protect otherwise
illegal drug use in worship service); Op. Att'y Gen. 93-414 (Ark. 1994) (advising proposed
AIDS curriculum in public schools does not violate RFRA); Op. Att'y Gen. 94-4 (Ind. 1994)
(advising RFRA does not compel preferential treatment for churches in the assessments of
storm water fees); 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 94-027 (Md. 1994) (advising RFRA does not exempt
motor vehicle operators from requirement to have photograph on operator's license).
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purely on RFRA's constitutionality). 8 Of these, 144 were federal court
decisions, and the remaining twenty-four were state court decisions.
These 168 decisions, cited in the attached Appendix to this article, break
down as follows:
1. Of the 144 federal court decisions, ninety-four involved prisoner
litigation (virtually all arising in state prison), and fifty involved contexts other
than prisons.
2. Of the twenty-four state decisions, five involved prisoner litigation
and nineteen involved other contexts.
3. Of the ninety-four federal court decisions involving claims by
prisoners, courts denied relief in eighty-five. Only nine cases involve orders
granting relief under RFRA.
4. Of the fifty federal court RFRA claims not involving prisoners,
RFRA claimants suffered forty-one denials of relief and won nine grants of
RFRA relief.
5. Of the twenty-four state cases (prison and non-prison combined),
RFRA claimants were denied relief in seventeen and granted relief in seven.
To recapitulate and summarize: In three and one-half years, RFRA
generated a significant quantity of litigation. Over 85% of the decisions were
in the federal courts. About 60% of the RFRA decisions occurred in prison
cases. 69 We will never know how many RFRA victories these cases might
have produced had Boerne not terminated their RFRA claims, as it did for all
cases involving state law (i.e., the huge majority of them). But we do know
that 143 of the 168 produced denials of relief, only twenty-five claims
produced grants of relief (for an overall win percentage of 15% of cases
decided on the merits), and that nine of these twenty-five were in prisoner
litigation, which typically involved the most basic infringements of religious
liberty.
The most intriguing aspect of RFRA's record is the number and wide
variety represented by the losses, particularly outside of prison. Of the non-
prison cases that have reached merits decisions, over 75% have produced
denials of relief. Of course, some cases appear more sympathetic than others;
one expects that reliance on RFRA as a defense to marijuana charges will be
treated less respectfully than RFRA claims regarding building a highway
68. This count includes only those cases in which courts considered some aspect of RFRA
merits and either granted or denied relief. It excludes cases in which courts did no more than
order a RFRA claim to proceed. For each category, I have counted only the last, pre-Boerne
disposition of each case.
69. Examination of RFRA filings and interim orders, as distinguished from case
dispositions, might well show that prisoner litigation made up an even higher frequency of all
RFRA claims.
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through an area where a child had been buried.7° When one recalls, however,
that RFRA had been trumpeted as the protection of religion against all the
religion-neutral, generally applicable rules that would beset it, and that RFRA's
terms appeared to widely and stringently protect religious exercise, this record
of success seems surprisingly tepid. Indeed, it is difficult to look at this record
and conclude that RFRA has made any significant contributions to religious
liberty outside of prisons. Even within prisons, the protection for religious
liberty has been limited to matters of bodily autonomy (hair and beards,7
symbol-wearing, 72 medical-test avoiding73), and has not been extended to
matters of prison space allocation.74 Moreover, RFRA has proven dear in its
demands of time and energy on prison officials and state lawyers engaged to
defend them.75
E. Analysis of Why RFRA Claims Did Not Succeed at a Greater Rate
I believe there are several interrelated causes for the infrequency of RFRA
victories. First, judges are uncomfortable with any claim of exemption from
general law. The law of free speech and free press have been generally
unsympathetic to such claims; courts often reject them as a form of special
pleading by the press, even when the challenged general policy touches
communications76 and especially when it does not.77 The symbolic speech
70. See United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding Church of
Marijuana not a religion within meaning of RFRA); Thirty v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding RFRA does not require alteration of highway route to avoid interference with
child's burial place), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 78 (1996).
71. See Estep v. Dent, 914 F. Supp. 1462 (W.D. Ky. 1996), aff'd without op. sub nom.,
82 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 1996); Lewis v. Scott, 910 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 127 F.3d
33 (5th Cir. Oct. 2, 1997) (No. 96-40301) ; Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471 (D. Arizona
1995).
72. See Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 117 S.
Ct. 2502 (1997); Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
73. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cit. 1996) (requiring Rastafarian prison inmate
to undergo tuberculosis screening violates RFRA).
74. See Johnson v. Baker, 67 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 1995); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948 (9th
Cir. 1995); Woods v. Evatt, 876 F. Supp. 756 (D.S.C. 1995), aff'd without op., 68 F.3d 413 (4th
Cir. 1995).
75. See statement by Jeffrey Sutton, Hearings, supra note 2. The Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 04-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915), has
resulted in more streamlined and less costly litigation by prisoners.
76. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (holding media defendant in libel
case has no first amendment privilege against discovery into research for the story); but see
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
77. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (holding press has no first
amendment immunity from National Labor Relations Act); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (holding press has no immunity from the Fair Labor Standards
Act).
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cases, like U.S. v. O'Brien,78 are only rhetorically supportive of pro-exemption
arguments; when claims of free speech privilege are pressed against speech-
neutral, generally applicable laws, speech loses. 9
Courts seem especially uncomfortable with claims of religious exemption.
Perhaps this is a simple case of a slippery slope, the slick surface of which
leads judges to fear that cases will be difficult to distinguish from one another,
with bad results ultimately appearing at the bottom of the incline. But I think
the prevailing tendencies are more religion-specific than that; after all, many
legal slopes are steep and slick, and judges take toeholds when they must.
Religion cases may be different for a variety of reasons. First, judges,
drawn from America's highly educated elite, may be skeptical about intensely
held religious commitments. Second, they may be sensitive to the possibility
of religious fraud, difficult for government to uncover without using intrusive
measures. Third, some judges perceive a danger of Establishment Clause
violations hanging over the project of religious exemptions. Fourth (and
related to the first three), judges may sense the dangers of bias in whatever they
do; they will have their own feelings, positive and negative, about various
religious traditions and movements, and they will know that it is very difficult
to separate those biases from the project of judging exemption claims. Better
no exemptions, they might well say, than a pattern of exemptions riddled by
religious favoritism. 8
0
These forces, I believe, explain the pre-Smith pattern of denial of free
exercise exemption claims in the Supreme Court and elsewhere,8' and explain
Smith itself. Congress, misled as to the pre-Smith law, enacted RFRA in the
teeth of these judicial sentiments. Even though Congress was, to some
uncalculated extent, trying to alter these trends, the Act's poorly defined terms
permitted them to continue.
The most significant, and least well-defined, term in RFRA is its action
trigger. RFRA comes into play if, and only if, government "substantially
burden[s]' '82 religious exercise. If government does so, the tests of compelling
78. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding First Amendment does not provide a defense against
crime of wilful destruction of draft card in a political protest).
79. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (holding First Amendment is
no defense to charge of public indecency against nude barroom dancers); Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (holding First Amendment is no defense to
violation of regulation prohibiting overnight camping in specified federal parks).
80. This, of course, is one of the grounds of Smith itself. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872
(1990).
81. See EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 625-29 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Noonan, J., dissenting) (surveying religious liberty decisions in the federal courts), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989); see also James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407 (1992).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994).
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interest and least restrictive means come into play. 3 These latter standards
have enough bite that judges seeking to limit exemptions will be inclined to
rely upon the "burden" requirement as the primary obstacle to RFRA
claimants.
Nor did Congress do anything to make it difficult for judges to so proceed.
With respect to this Act-triggering requirement of "substantial burden,"
Congress did not purport to change the law. Rather, RFRA's history reflects
an effort to codify prior judge-made law on the subject."' As students of
religious liberty well know, however, the prior law was poorly defined and
subject to pro-government manipulation." Consequently, as catalogued below,
judges in the earliest RFRA cases were not well-guided by pre-RFRA law and
launched out on their own, typically in ways which limited the scope of RFRA.
And, later RFRA cases built upon the earlier ones to develop a body of RFRA
"burdens" law that placed the bar very high for RFRA claimants. Indeed, so
effective was this RFRA-limiting device that a stunningly high proportion of
all RFRA claims decided on the merits prior to Boerne involved rejection of
claims as presenting insubstantial burdens.8 6
Judges have used a variety of interpretive moves to disqualify RFRA
claims on the grounds of insufficient burden on religion. The most common
device has been to limit RFRA's coverage to claims of unavoidable conflict
between religious and legal duty; that is, to those cases in which government
required action forbidden by religion or prohibited action compelled by
religion.87 Limiting cognizable burdens to cases of compulsion excludes from
statutory coverage a huge amount of behavior which is motivated, in whole or
in part, by religious belief.88 The judicial impulse to exclude from RFRA
activity discretionary with the believer (and, in some cases, with possible
83. See id. at § 2000bb-l(b) (1994).
84. See H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st sess. at 6-7 (1993); S. REP. No. 111, 103d
Cong., Ist sess., at 9 (1993).
85. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise
of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1989).
86. One hundred one of the 143 denials of RFRA relief in the courts, see text
accompanying supra notes 69-70, involved a holding that the burden presented was
insubstantial within the meaning of RFRA. The burden requirement thus accounted for over
70% of the RFRA defeats in court.
87. See Goodall v. Stafford County, 60 F.3d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 706 (1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11 th Cir. 1995). For an even more
restrictive standard, see Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (limiting RFRA to
cases of religious compulsion with respect to a practice central to the claimant's belief system).
See generally, Steven Seeger, Note, Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Motivation Test
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1472 (1997).
88. For defense of the proposition that all religiously motivated conduct is covered by
RFRA, see Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1443-44 (W.D. Wis. 1995), ajffd, 91 F.3d
1018 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
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material as well as religious motivation) is understandable, but its conse-
quences for RFRA were widespread and negative.
Judge Posner has suggested a second device for limiting RFRA's scope.
In his attempt to synthesize the law of RFRA burdens in Mack v. O'Leary,
89
Judge Posner reasoned that the quality of the impact of the government action
upon religion also affected judicial determinations of whether a government
practice substantially burdened religion. Prohibitions, in his view, are more
troublesome than inhibitions, which tend to make religion more expensive yet
still possible.90 A great deal of the regulation of the activities of religious
institutions, including land use and fundraising, inhibit without prohibiting
religious exercise. In Mack, Judge Posner concluded that RFRA made
actionable all prohibitions on religiously motivated behavior, while inhibitions
had to fall upon central religious practices in order to fall within RFRA's
scope.
However reasonable the prohibition-inhibition distinction may seem at
first glance, 9' this is a gloss which nothing in RFRA or its history directly
supports. Moreover, the distinction is actually quite elusive, as one would
expect a judge trained in economics to perceive; for a person or worship
community with very few resources, making religious practice considerably
more expensive is a way of effectively prohibiting it. In addition, as Judge
Posner himself says elsewhere in Mack,92 the problem of deciding whether a
practice is central to a religious tradition seems highly inappropriate as a
judicial inquiry. Thus, however reasonable the Mack approach may appear, it
serves to highlight the intractable difficulties created by the burden require-
ment.
Third, courts frequently excluded cases of sectarian discrimination from
RFRA. Most of these arose in prison, and typically involved prison authorities
providing time and space for worship to sects on a generic basis.93 Unavoid-
89. 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) cert. granted and judgment vacated by, O'Leary
v. Mack, 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997).
90. Land use regulation imposed on places of worship tend to have this effect. See, e.g.,
Germantown Seventh-Day Adventist Church v. City of Philadelphia, 54 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.
1995) (finding no RFRA exemption from requirement to add parking spaces as part of church
expansion project).
91. For examples of case law in which this distinction operates to exclude claims from
RFRA coverage, see Smith v. Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm'n., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 913 P.2d 909
(1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2531 (1997); In re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1994); Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1994).
92. See Mack, 80F.3dat 1179.
93. See, e.g., Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding limitation of worship
opportunities of fundamentalist separatist Christian); Woods v. Evatt, 876 F. Supp. 756 (D.S.C.
1995) (holding Muslims need not be afforded worship opportunities equal to Christians;
inequality not a "substantial burden"), aff'd without op., 68 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 1995).
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ably, these practices (however justified by prison resource limitations) led to
favoritism for the relatively mainstream version of the sect and disadvantage
for dissenting versions. Nevertheless, courts held that such discrimination did
not constitute a RFRA burden, and upheld such practices under the deferential
constitutional standards applicable to prison authorities.
Even outside of prison, courts at times held that discrimination against
religion generally did not constitute a "substantial burden" under RFRA. In
Fordham University v. Brown,94 the district court upheld a Commerce
Department policy which excluded Fordham from government aid in building
a radio transmitter on the ground that the station would broadcast a weekly
Mass for shut-ins. The government defended its policy on Establishment
Clause grounds, which the court held sufficient to justify an exclusion from
RFRA's coverage; i.e., that government compliance with a reasonable view of
non-establishment could not be held to be an actionable burden under RFRA.95
For those claims that cleared the hurdle of "substantial burdens," the
statutory tests of compelling interests and least restrictive alternative came into
play. Here, too, however, judges found ways to undercut the rigors of these
statutory requirements. One might expect that the obvious method for doing
this was dilution of the compelling interest portion of the standard; that is,
recognizing garden variety state interests as being of overriding importance.
The most common instrment of standard-weakening, however, turned out to
be more subtle; it involved smuggling in some unspecified measure of
expedience or practicality into the calculation of "least restrictive means."
Rather than ask whether the state's means were least restrictive (and upholding
RFRA claims when the means could not be so characterized), some courts
asked whether the alternative, less religion-restrictive means were so expensive,
cumbersome, or inconvenient that the state could not reasonably be expected
to use them.' If the alternative means failed this inquiry, these courts upheld
the challenged practice, even though it was demonstrably not the least
restrictive.
94. 856 F. Supp. 684, 700-01 (D.D.C. 1994).
95. The government revised its policy of nonestablishment-based exclusion of such aid
while the case was pending appeal. See 60 Fed. Reg. 66491 (1995) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
pt. 2301) (1995). To my knowledge, no one has challenged the revised policy on Establishment
Clause grounds, nor would they be likely to prevail if they did. See Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (invalidating
nonestablishment-based exclusion of religiously oriented journal from subsidy for journals of
student opinion at state university).
96. See Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996); Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d
499, 501 (11 th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2422 (1997); Diaz v. Collins, 872 F. Supp.
353 (E.D. Tex. 1994), afld, 114 F.3d 69 (5th Cir. 1997). Similar techniques for weakening the
least restrictive means requirement also appeared in non-prison cases. See In re Newman, 203
B.R. 468 (Bankr. Kan. 1996).
[Vol. 20
THE FAILURE OF RFRA
Thus, whether the device involved a narrow interpretation of "substantial
burden" or a state-generous construction of the means-ends requirements of
RFRA, courts made it considerably more difficult than they might have for
RFRA claims to prevail. As a result, at least insofar as the litigation record
demonstrates, RFRA resulted in surprisingly little protection for religion. And,
as the caselaw developed that way, the leverage of RFRA claimants in
settlement or pre-litigation negotiations with government presumably
diminished as well. If the goal of RFRA was to empower religious believers
and institutions, it accomplished far less than its backers hoped and promised.
III. THE LESSONS OF RFRA AND THE FUTURE
OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
The pre-Smith law, Smith itself, and the RFRA gloss all suggest strongly
that a crisply codified doctrine of free exercise exemptions cannot be made to
work. Judges could not effectively administer such a doctrine under the
Constitution, legislatures could not adequately define the standards to govern
such exemptions, and even with a federal statute calling for the reinstatement
of the doctrine, judges undermined it in a variety of ways.
Law reformers should keep this history in mind. It suggests that state
level RFRA's (should any be enacted) will likely fare no better than the federal
RFRA. Although the success rate of nonprison RFRA claims was considerably
higher in state courts than in federal courts,97 the total number of state cases
was small. In any event, the higher success rate in state courts may well have
been a function of state courts taking federal law more seriously than federal
courts, rather than greater respect in state courts for the claims of religion.
State courts construing and applying state level RFRA's would be a new and
different phenomenon, driven in part by whatever legislative formulation and
history each state produced.
Even if Congress were to enact a new federal RFRA, based perhaps on the
spending power, the judicial tendencies analyzed above would make it no more
likely than its predecessor to succeed as a policy matter. 98 At either the state
or federal level, special attention to prisons would be salutary. Prisoner
litigation is frequent and costly to defend. Moreover, because judges are
especially unwilling to impose a strict version of RFRA on prison administra-
tors, such litigation generates interpretations of any general religious liberty
97. See text accompanying supra note 69 and attached Appendix.
98. If enforcement is limited to federal agencies monitoring the use of federal funds which
they dispense, I predict it will achieve even less than its predecessor. Private enforcement is
necessary, though obviously insufficient, to keep the states honest.
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statute that in turn will tend to weaken the Act in non-prison litigation.99 At the
very least, prison cases should be made subject to an explicitly different
standard than non-prison cases, so that the results in the latter are not dragged
down by the interpretations in the former. Given the pattern of RFRA cases in
prison, discussed above,"° limiting RFRA rights in prison to matters of bodily
autonomy might be the soundest solution.
Perhaps a full-scale federal constitutional amendment, designed to
enshrine a doctrine of free exercise exemptions into the constitutional text
itself, could accomplish the task of robustly protecting religious liberty.' 01
Were such an amendment to be politically feasible, it might have sufficient
force to overcome judicial reluctance to create a robust doctrine of exemptions.
Surely courts would take more seriously the command of the entire polity, as
represented by an enactment that has successfully completed the debate and
deliberation one would expect from the amendment process, than courts took
RFRA, which never attracted the kind of rigorous policy debate it deserved.'0 2
That sort of debate, however, would highlight what politicians fear most; sharp
conflicts between intensely held values. Such an amendment is therefore
extremely unlikely, precisely because of the conflicts among the forces which
would have to support it in order for it to become law. And, if my analysis is
correct, even such an amendment would not solve the problem of judicial
narrowing by construction, a process I would expect to begin immediately after
ratification.
Does this analysis mean that religious liberty in America is in peril,
standing as it does at the mercy of a subversive or (at best) unsympathetic
judiciary? A more refined view suggests otherwise. I believe that religious
liberty will be more than adequately protected in the near future, and for a
variety of reasons. 03 First, and most important, American political culture is
sympathetic to the basic idea of freedom from government-backed persecution
on religious grounds. Correspondingly, the legal system is already sensitive
99. While I do not think this is inevitable, I do believe it has occurred in the RFRA cases,
especially those involving the meaning of "substantial burden," which presumably should be
identical in and out of prison.
100. See text accompanying supra notes 71-75.
101. This has been proposed, with the operative language being identical to RFRA's. See
Nathan Lewin, It's Time For a Religious Freedom Amendment, THE WASH. POST, July 3, 1997
at A 19 (op-ed calling for a constitutional amendment to overturn the result in Boerne).
102. For a more elaborate and general discussion of the difference between constitutional
amendments and statutes with similar, constitution-like designs, see Ira C. Lupu, Statutes
Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1 (1993).
103. That RFRA may yet be valid against the federal government counts for little among
them.
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to outright and intentional state-backed religious oppression, which under
current law presumptively violates the First Amendment. "
Second, Smith has engendered active and continued opposition among
Justices still on the Supreme Court,0 5 including in Boerne itself,"° and may
yet be overruled. The Court without question will be far more willing to
reconsider its own judgment than to permit Congress to overturn a judicial
interpretation of the Constitution. Judicial overruling of Smith respects judicial
prerogative in declaring the meaning of the Constitution; RFRA, by sharp
contrast, directly challenged that prerogative. Longstanding dynamics of
power separation and institutional self-protection suggest that the Court is far
for more likely to overrule itself than to permit another Branch to dictate to it
the meaning of the Constitution.
More immediately, the presence of active and continued commitment
from judges, lawyers, and academics will invite the discovery of Smith's
affirmative potential. That decision, disingenuously or otherwise, suggested
that some religious liberty claims might yet prevail. In particular, the Smith
opinion said that so-called "hybrid" claims (those involving the convergence
of religious and secular constitutional rights), and claims involving individual-
ized factual assessment, remain viable candidates for favorable treatment, even
if claims for exemption from religion-neutral, generally applicable laws were
not."°7 Lukumi holds actionable under the First Amendment religious
gerrymanders, laws which, upon close inspection, are designed intentionally
to disadvantage religion. Moreover, other constitutional doctrines, unchal-
lenged in Smith, may occasionally lend support to the claims of religious
institutions and religiously motivated actors. 108
104. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
105. See id. at 564-77 (Souter, J., concurring); see Smith, 494 U.S. at 894-901 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
106. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176-2185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Id. at 2185-86
(Souter, J., dissenting).
107. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 895. The "individualized assessment" exception in Smith is
quite promising. It rests on a concern that official discretion, once in exercise, not underweight
or discriminate against religion. Professors Sager & Eisgruber have sketched a provocative and
innovative theory of constitutional protection for religion around this notion, which they
conceptualize as a requirement of "equal regard" for religion. See Lawrence Sager &
Christopher Eisgruber, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for
Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Ctu. L. REv. 1245 (1994). My colleague Bob Tuttle, in
a forthcoming piece, will analyze the ways in which religious institutions may rely on this
theme of discretion and its abuse in challenging adverse land-use planning decisions. See
Robert Tuttle, Religious Institutions and Land Use Decisions (manuscript on file with the
author).
108. See, e.g., Bessard v. California Community Colleges, 867 F. Supp. 1454 (E.D. Cal.
1994) (RFRA and the First Amendment bar application of compulsory loyalty oath to public
employee with religious objections to the oath); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455
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Even before Boerne undid RFRA, courts had already begun to build on
these suggestions in a series of decisions which grant relief for religious liberty
claims under the state or federal constitutions rather than RFRA. For example,
in Rader v. Johnston,'°9 a district court gave relief to a state university student
who wanted to live off-campus for reasons motivated by religion. The court
found that the pattern of exemptions in the rules governing off-campus living
was not religion-neutral. In Keeler v. Mayor and City Council of
Cumberland,"o a district court judge who had ruled RFRA unconstitutional
nevertheless gave relief to a church opposing historic preservation orders on
grounds that the orders constituted an uncompensated taking of private
property. And, in some states, state constitutions have been read to provide a
platform for religious exemptions. 1' In Attorney General v. Desilets, 1 2 for
example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the state
constitution presumptively protected a landlord against being compelled to rent
an apartment to unmarried cohabitants; the landlord had refused to do so on
religious grounds. Similar claims by landlords under RFRA had twice been
rejected by state supreme courts. 113
What most of the judicial victories for religious liberty in the past five
years have in common cannot be reduced to any simple, RFRA-type formula.
Instead, what they seem to reveal is judicial capability to assess the competing
equities and protect religion when it is suffering a significant harm and the
state's interest in inflicting that harm is weak. Whether one calls such a process
common law constitutionalism, ad hoc interest balancing, or doing equity
under the Constitution, these cases reveal that judges are as likely to rule
favorably for religion in "truly sympathetic" cases as they were to undercut
RFRA by construction in "truly unsympathetic" ones. Moreover, the claims
most likely to receive favorable treatment are those which (following Dean
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding RFRA and anti-entanglement concerns of the Establishment Clause
bar gender discrimination suit against religiously affiliated university by a female denied tenure
in the canon law department); see also Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994)
(Establishment Clause and RFRA bar inquiry into employment relations between church and
its clergy). Bessard, Catholic University, and Powell may themselves be "hybrid rights"
decisions.
109. 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996).
110. 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996).
111. See generally Angela Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise:
An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275. The enactment of RFRA had
tended to undercut the development of state constitutional law; the invalidation of RFRA may
reinvigorate that process.
112. 418 Mass. 316, 636 N.E.2d 233 (1994).
113. See Smith v. Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2531 (1997); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska
1994), cert. denied, 513 S. Ct. 979 (1994).
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Rodney Smith) demonstrate strong claims of individual conscience,"' or
(following Professor Laycock) institutional survival and autonomy,'15
especially when such claims are opposed by weak state interests.
The idea that religion will fare better under constitutional standards,
unarticulated in any sweeping and general way, than under the strict
codification presented by RFRA, needs some explaining. Perhaps religious
exemption claims fare best when the law that governs them is deeply rooted in
common law methodology, fact-specific and only weakly attached to
overarching norms. Such a method permits courts to locate sympathetic claims
without excessive fear that one favorable result for religion will loose the
horrible parade. Moreover, a methodology of this sort permits religion-
favoring decisions to be grounded in closely woven tapestries of religious
practice, institution, history, and community. "6 Such a grounding may permit
subtle distinctions, and reduce anti-religious resentment by making special
treatment more palatable in individual cases.
Without question, dangers of invidious discrimination attend
constitutional adjudication conducted on these terms. The absence of
accessible public rules to govern disputes between religion and the state
aggravates that very possibility. Nevertheless, such a process is superior to
disingenuous codifications of religious liberty, and to more particularistic
accommodations by legislatures, in which only politically influential sects will
114. See Bessard v. California Community Colleges, 867 F. Supp. 1454 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding state may not force loyalty oaths on Jehovah's Witnesses in public employment);
Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996) (holding University cannot insist that
students who object to dorm life on religious grounds live in dormitory in light of the pattern
of other exemptions from the requirement); Attorney General v. Desilets, 418 Mass. 316, 636
N.E.2d 233 (1994) (holding state constitution presumptively protects landlord who refuses to
rent to unmarried cohabitants); see generally Rodney Smith, Conscience, Coercion and the
Establishment of Religion: The Beginning of an End to the Wanderings of a Wayward
Judiciary?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 917 (1993).
115. See Keeler v. Cumberland, 951 F. Supp. 83 (D. Md. 1997) (holding constitutional
limits on church destroying historic preservation order); EEOC v. The Catholic Univ. Of Am.,
83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding church controlled university is not subject to gender
discrimination suit by disappointed female denied tenure in Canon Law department); Powell
v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding church not subject to Age
Discrimination suit by high school theology teacher). See generally Douglas Laycock, Towards
a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right
to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981). 1 have more doubt as to the
appropriateness of special treatment for religious institutions as distinguished from claims of
personal religious conscience. See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemptions and Religious
Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391 (1987).
116. For the best example of this sort of justification for religious exemptions, see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
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be heard. Of our public decision-making practices, only adjudication imposes
obligations to decide and give public reasons for the decision.' 1
7
IV. CONCLUSION
All along, RFRA supporters have held out the Act as the backstop for
religion in America. The Act would take over the task of the Free Exercise
Clause, i.e., block all of the horrible things that government might inadver-
tently do to religious practice and community." 8 The results of RFRA in
action, however, suggest that RFRA was such a backstop in a most happen-
stance way, and hence did not constitute the source of security its proponents
claimed. The backstop against state oppression of religion has been, and
remains, the Constitution.
The RFRA story demonstrates that blunt and codified rules are poor tools
for the task of locating those special occasions when different and favorable
treatment for religion is warranted. What made good political strategy in
enacting RFRA, the high road of generality and vigorous statutory language,
made perfectly bad legal strategy in implementing it. In the end, RFRA was
too strenuous for judges to stomach; desiring to reach results they thought
reasonable, they gutted RFRA by construction. Only in prisons, in which the
constitutional doctrines are highly deferential to authority' 19 where RFRA was
to be otherwise, did RFRA systematically outperform the Constitution itself
(and not by much). RFRA has been a disappointment for many reasons, but
among them was its unfulfillable promise that judges would construe it as
written and protect religion across the board. The results included diverse and
dubious interpretations of RFRA, and crushed expectations concerning its
protection of religious liberty in actual practice. RFRA demonstrated that more
may indeed be less, and that the process of constitutional adjudication should
be allowed to work itself out on questions of religious liberty after Smith.
General legislation to "help" religion is politically tempting, but it
inevitably will prove to be a mistake. Such legislation will foment litigation
and aid religion little. Indeed, to the extent that the litigation and costs of its
defense generate anti-religious backlash, as is entirely possible, such legislation
has the potential to hurt religion more than it helps. Accordingly, I have simple
advice for legislators, especially for the short run. Trust the courts to reach
117. For elaboration of this view, see Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment
Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555,
599-609 (1991).
118. See House RFRA Hearings, supra note 9, at 14 (statement of Rep. Solarz that RFRA
is needed because, under Smith, government could bar the use of wine in religious sacraments).
119. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
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reasonable results under existing state and federal law. Recognize that
religious liberty is not broken, and that legislatures cannot fix it. At the very
least, be sure that any new enactment will produce results more religion-
favorable than current law. In brief, for most lawmakers, my recommendation
is simply to let it be.
CITATION APPENDIX - RFRA CLAIMS IN WHICH RELIEF WAS
GRANTED OR DENIED (PRE-BOERNE)
I. FEDERAL COURTS-NON-PRISON CLAIMS
A. Relief Under RFRA Granted (Including Preliminary Relief)
1. Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1997) (prohibitions on
military chaplains lobbying Congress imposes a substantial burden on
chaplains' free exercise rights under RFRA).
2. Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997) (RFRA
violated by district attorney's action in taping a suspect's intended confession
to priest while suspect was in county jail).
3. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995) (RFRA precludes
enforcement of weapons ban against students whose religious beliefs required
them at all times to carry ceremonial knives).
4. United States v. Gonzales, 957 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.M. 1997)
(regulations governing Native Americans seeking to kill bald eagles for
religious purposes did not constitute least restrictive means by which to further
government's compelling interest in propagation in survival of bald eagle and
thus violated RFRA).
5. Stuart Circle Parish v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Richmond, 946
F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1996) (zoning code which limited feeding and
housing programs for homeless within churches to no more than 30 homeless
individuals for up to seven days between October and April violates RFRA).
6. Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of
D.C., 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994) (enforcement of zoning regulations and
decision of zoning administrator and board that prohibited church from feeding
homeless persons on its premises violates RFRA).
7. Rourke v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 915 F. Supp.
525 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (prison regulation barring long hair on corrections officer
violates RFRA as applied to a member of Mohawk Nation who practiced
traditional Longhouse religion).
8. Bessard v. California Community Colleges, 867 F. Supp. 1454 (E.D.
Cal. 1994) (requiring loyalty oath of Jehovah's Witnesses as condition
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precedent to consideration for employment at community college violates
R RA).
9. In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996) (RFRA precludes
recovery as fraudulent transfers of pre-petition tithing contributions to churches
by debtors in bankruptcy), vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
B. Relief Under RFRA Denied 20
1. International Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of Chicago
Heights, 955 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (denial of special use permit to
build a new church on land zoned for business and commercial use only is not
a substantial burden within the meaning of RFRA).
2. Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F.
Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (denial of church request that a piece of land be
denoted as semi-public use in order for it to build a church and other buildings
to serve homeless men does not constitute substantial burden).
3. Germantown Seventh' Day Adventist Church v. City of Philadelphia,
1994 WL 470191 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (mem.) (denial of permission to Church to
build addition because Church had not complied with city requirements for
parking spaces for nonresidential use in residential district does not constitute
substantial burden).
4. Thirty v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996) (RFRA action to
enjoin condemnation of real estate to be used in connection with highway
construction project, on grounds that plaintiffs' stillborn baby was buried
within parcel rejected for lack of substantial burden).
5. Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (restrictions in
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act on impeding access do not
substantially burden the religious beliefs and practices of abortion protesters).
6. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (1lth Cir. 1995) (same as Terry).
7. Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Cal.
1994) (same as Terry; alternatively holding that government has compelling
interest in protecting access to abortion clinics).
8. American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995) (same as Council for Life Coalition).
9. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Southeastern Pa., Inc. v. Walton, 949
F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (same as American Life League).
120. This enumeration excludes decisions in which relief under RFRA was denied because
the court held RFRA unconstitutional. See, e.g., Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of
Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591 (D. Md. 1996).
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10. United States v. Dinwiddie, 885 F. Supp. 1286 (W.D. Mo. 1995)
(same as Cheffer).
11. United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis. 1994);
mandamus denied sub nom., Hatch v. Stadtmueller, 141 F.3d 1510 (7th Cir.
1994); and affd sub nom, United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, Hatch v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 507 (1996) (same as
Cheffer).
12. Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994) (same as Council
for Life Coalition).
13. In re Bloch, 207 B.R. 944 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) (recovery by
trustee in bankruptcy of tithes to church is not a substantial burden and least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest).
14. In re Newman, 203 B.R. 468 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996) (recovery by
trustee in bankruptcy of tithes to church is not a substantial burden on debtor's
religion).
15. In re Scroggins, 209 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997) (bankruptcy
court order requiring parochial school to release transcripts of students filing
for bankruptcy does not substantially burden religion).
16. Lumpkin v. Brown, 109 F.3d 1498 (9th Cir. 1997) (government has
compelling interest in removing human rights commissioner for making anti-
gay statements).
17. Helland v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327 (7th Cir.
1996) (public school's removal of teacher from substitute teacher list because
of his improper interjection of religion into classroom is least restrictive means
of furthering a compelling government interest), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 769
(1997).
18. Silk v. City of Chicago, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8334 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(denial of adjustment of shift time to attend church does not create a substantial
burden on religion).
19. Blanken v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation and Correction, 944 F.
Supp. 1359 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (Ohio prisons have compelling interest in
applying grooming policy requiring short hair to prison employee).
20. United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997) (government
has compelling interest in protecting bald eagles sufficient to overcome RFRA
claim by Native Americans seeking eagle feathers and parts for religious use).
21. United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Or. 1996) (same
as Hugs).
22. United States v. Jim, 888 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Or. 1995) (same as
Hugs).
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23. United States v. DeWitt, 95 F.3d 1374 (8th Cir. 1996) (RFRA
defense to drug charges rejected on grounds that defendant's beliefs were not
religious).
24. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996) (same as
DeWitt).
25. Klemka v. Nichols, 943 F. Supp. 470 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (arrest of
mother, on grounds of child endangerment, in church did not substantially
burden her religious exercise).
26. Levinson-Roth v. Parries, 872 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Md. 1995) (forcing
Orthodox woman to remove wig as part of search incident to arrest does not
violate RFRA).
27. United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 134 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(laws against growing marijuana and manufacturing peyote are least restrictive
means of fulfilling a compelling government interest, and therefore do not
violate RFRA as applied to defendant with religious motivation for drug use),
cert. denied, Brown v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1581 (1996).
28. Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
Goehring v. del Junco, 117 S. Ct. 1335 (1997) (mandatory student registration
fee, used in part to cover abortion services, does not substantially burden
religion of students forced to pay the fee).
29. Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 1995)
(requiring parents to pay for cued speech transliterator for their child in private
sectarian school, when the state would pay if the child were enrolled in public
school, does not constitute substantial burden), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 706
(1996).
30. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-1, 942 F. Supp. 511
(W.D. Okla. 1996) (refusing request of child, home schooled for religious
reasons, to take part-time classes at public school does not constitute a
substantial burden).
31. Harless v. Darr, 937 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (refusing to
permit first-grader to distribute religious tracts to other first-graders in his
public school class does not constitute substantial burden).
32. Battles v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 904 F. Supp. 471 (D.
Md. 1995) (Maryland rule requiring parents to consent to state monitoring of
home schooling does not constitute substantial burden), aff'd without op., 95
F.3d 41 (4th Cir. 1996).
33. Trinity United Methodist Parish v. Board of Educ. of City Sch. Dist.
of City of Newburgh, 907 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (city school district
refusal of permission to group to perform magic show which includes religious
service in school during nonschool hours does not implicate matter central to
group's beliefs and therefore does not constitute substantial burden).
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34. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1995)
(public high school student, who is Jewish, forced to choose between singing
explicitly religious songs in school choir or voluntarily resigning during the
Christmas season and accepting an A and honors is not substantially burdened
in her religious exercise).
35. Gospel Missions of Am. v. Bennett, 951 F. Supp. 1429 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (city and county ordinances which reasonably regulate financial
solicitations for religious mission does not constitute substantial burden).
36. Storm v. Town of Woodstock, 944 F. Supp. 139 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)
(prohibition on evening parking near site of spiritual meetings does not
constitute substantial burden).
37. Ellis v. Graves, No. 95-C-6800, 1996 WL 411469 (N.D. Ill. Jul 18,
1996) (complaint of local conspiracy against church and its minister does not
present a substantial burden).
38. Dickerson v. Stuart, 877 F. Supp. 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (state's
midwifery practice law does not present substantial burden on religious
exercise of woman who, in accordance with her religious beliefs, prays for,
encourages, and assists parents in giving birth to their children at home).
39. Fordham Univ. v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1994) (denial
of funding for University radio transmitter, on grounds that radio station will
broadcast Catholic Mass, does not constitute substantial burden).
40. In re Turner, 193 B.R. 548 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (requiring use
of social security number on bankruptcy forms does not constitute substantial
burden on form preparer with religious objections to use of the number).
41. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1994) (police
department investigation of its Assistant Police Chief, triggered in part by his
socially conservative religious views, does not constitute substantial burden).
II. FEDERAL COURTS- PRISON CLAIMS
A. Relief Under RFRA Granted (Including Preliminary Relief)
1. Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996) (application of
prison regulation banning wearing of jewelry to religious crucifixes violates
RFRA), vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
2. Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996) (requiring Rastafarian
prison inmate to undergo screening test for latent tuberculosis violates RFRA).
3. Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727 (D.V.I. 1997) (officials' strip
searches impermissibly burdened pretrial detainees' right to exercise freely their
religion in violation of RFRA).
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4. Estep v. Dent, 914 F. Supp. 1462 (W.D. Ky. 1996) (likelihood of
success on merits of prison inmate's claim that prison policy requiring him to
cut his earlocks violated RFRA), aff'd without opinion sub. nom., Estep v.
O'Dea, 82 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 1996).
5. Alameen v. Coughlin, 892 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (correc-
tional facility policy prohibiting display of black dhikr beads by Sufi Muslim
inmates to aid in reciting or recalling of names of Allah is not least restrictive
means of preventing use of beads to signal gang affiliation, and violates
RFRA).
6. Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (Likelihood
of success on RFRA merits of challenge to prison rule prohibiting inmates from
wearing Orisha beads in conformity with Santeria religion).
7. Rodriguez v. Coughlin, No. 94 Civ. 2290(55), 1994 WL 174298,
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) (sister case to Campos).
8. Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471 (D. Ariz. 1995) (likelihood of
success on merits of RFRA challenge to prison policies involving prisoners'
attempts to maintain kosher diet, keep facial hair at certain length, and wear
head covering of particular color).
9. Lewis v. Scott. 910 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (enforcement of
prison grooming policy, to extent that it prevented Orthodox Muslim inmate
from growing 1/4 inch beard for religious reasons, violated RFRA), rev d, 127
F.3d 33 (5th Cir. 1997) (post-Boerne).
B. Relief Under RFRA Denied
1. Malik v. Kindt, 107 F.3d 21 (10th Cir. 1997) (Table, Text in Westlaw),
Unpublished Disposition, 1997 WL 39429 (10th Cir. 1997) (denying prisoner
the right to attend Friday night Muslim religious services while placed in the
Special Housing Unit is least restrictive means to achieve compelling state
interest).
2. Haff v. Cooke, 923 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (seizure of
prison inmate's white supremacist reading materials does not constitute a
substantial burden under RFRA).
3. Lemay v. Dubois, No. CIV. A. 95-11912-PBS, 1996 WL 463680 (D.
Mass. July 29, 1996) (denying Native American prisoner access to spiritual
necklace and medallion, deer tail hair tie, feathers, sage, and cedar, does not
constitute substantial burden under RFRA).
4. Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1997) (series of restrictions on
prison inmate who is fundamentalist separatist Christian, including rules
limiting range of Protestant services available and number of books in a cell do
not constitute a substantial burden).
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5. Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69 (5th Cir. 1997) (prison ban on length of
hair and possession of sacred items does not constitute substantial burden under
RFRA).
6. Bruton v. McGinnis, 110 F.3d 63 (6th Cir. 1997) (denial of prison
inmate's right to have a Christian identity pin or wear specific Christian
identity T-shirt does not constitute a substantial burden under RFRA).
7. May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring Rastafarian
inmate to unbraid dredlocks is least restrictive means to compelling interest)
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 312 (1997).
8. Canell v. Jacobson, 108 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1997) (limitations on
arrangements for ritual washing by Sunni Muslim do not constitute substantial
burden).
9. Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 1997) (confiscation of
inmate's prayer pipe did not constitute substantial burden), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 320 (1997).
10. Bowman v. Department of Corrections, 108 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1997)
(official refusal to photocopy announcement of prayer meeting does not
constitute substantial burden).
11. Bailey v. Ignacio, 106 F.3d 406 (9th Cir. 1997) (failure to provide
nutritionally adequate diet during the Holy Week of Ramadan does not
constitute a substantial burden).
12. Mollie v. Ward, 106 F.3d 414 (Table, Text in Westlaw), Unpub-
lished Disposition, 1997 WL 22525 (10th Cir. 1997) (series of complaints
about inadequate opportunity to follow dictates of Islam; no substantial
burden).
13. Werner v. McCotter, 106 F.3d 414 (10th Cir. 1997) (officials' failure
to provide to Native American shamanist either 1) Cherokee Native American
spiritual advisor or 2) religious literature or religious symbols does not
constitute substantial burden), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1852 (1997), reh "g
denied, 118 S. Ct. 6 (1997).
14. Arguello v. Duckworth, 106 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 1997) (government
has compelling interest in prohibiting prisoner from possessing medallions,
bandanas, and sacred herbs claimed central to his native American religion).
15. Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466 (9th Cir. 1996) (confiscation
of religious book that advocated violence against Jews and government does
not constitute a substantial burden).
16. Sunni Muslim Community of Or. State Penitentiary v. Jacobson, 100
F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 1996) (permitting inmates, considered by other inmates not
to be true Sunni Muslims, to attend Sunni service does not violate RFRA).
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17. Dyer v. Stevens, 99 F.3d 1138 (6th Cir. 1996) (denial of pork-free
diet to county jail inmate does not violate the Act), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1266 (1997).
18. Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499 (1lth Cir. 1996) (state has
compelling interest in cutting inmate's hair), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2422
(1997).
19. Cubero v. Burton, 96 F.3d 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (denial to Native
American inmates of religious materials, permission to "smudge" in their
rooms, and maintenance of sweat lodge does not constitute substantial burden).
20. Ochs v. Thalacker, 90 F.3d 293 (8th Cir. 1996) (state has compelling
interest in denying inmate's religiously-motivated request to have same-race
inmate).
21. Dugger v. Copeland, 89 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 1996) (similar to Ochs).
22. Boyd v. Arizona, 87 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. 1996) (prison regulations
that limit inmate's physical contact with his wife do not constitute a substantial
burden).
23. Rust v. Clarke, 89 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 1996) (compelling interest in
denying religious accommodations sought by practitioners of Asatru religion),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 398 (1996).
24. Fawaad v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1084 (1lth Cir. 1996) (compelling interest
in requiring inmates to use religious names and commitment names on
incoming mail).
25. Ali v. Denver Reception & Diagnostic Ctr., 82 F.3d 425 (10th Cir.
1996) (refusal to provide Orthodox Muslim inmate with meat prepared
according to requirements of Halal diet does not constitute a substantial
burden).
26. Smith v. Beatty, 82 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 1996) (denial of right to
engage in communal worship while in segregation for assault does not
constitute substantial burden).
27. Flick v. Leonard, 81 F.3d 160 (6th Cir. 1996) (denial of access to
particular dietary program does not constitute a substantial burden).
28. Hunter v. Baldwin, 78 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 1996) (returning Christian
identity pamphlet to publisher without showing it to inmate does not constitute
substantial burden).
29. Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504 (2d Cir. 1996) (prisoner transfer did
not constitute substantial burden).
30. Miller-Bey v. Schultz, 77 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996) (denial of
inmate's religious documentation or "nationality" card does not constitute
substantial burden).
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31. Wynn v. McManus, 76 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 1996) (policy of sign up
for and rationing attendance at religious services does not constitute substantial
burden).
32. Coronel v. Hawaii, 76 F.3d 385 (9th Cir. 1996) (database does not
contain information beyond denial of RFRA claim).
33. Dickinson v. Herman, 85 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1996) (state has
compelling interest in mandatory tuberculosis test for inmates).
34. Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996) (state is using least
restrictive means to compelling interest in denying to Native American inmate
the right to wear his hair long and have access to a sweat lodge), reh 'g en banc
denied, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996); cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 193 (1996)
35. Shabazz v. Parsons, 73 F.3d 374 (10th Cir. 1996) (denial of access
to magazine Muhammad Speaks does not constitute substantial burden), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1834 (1996).
36. Abate v. Walton, 77 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of special
religious diet to claimed member of Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church
does not constitute substantial burden).
37. Hall v. Sullivan, 73 F.3d 373 (10th Cir. 1995) (denial of rights to
specific literature and separate meetings of Islamic sect does not constitute
substantial burden).
38. Treff v. Cook, 70 F.3d 123 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim of
insufficient access to Jewish services within prison).
39. Johnson v. Baker, 67 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 1995) (denial of separate
services for specific Islamic sect does not constitute substantial burden).
40. Dickinson v. Austin, 60 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1995) (denial of right to
wear a swastika medallion does not constitute substantial burden).
41. Miller v. Fields, 56 F.3d 78 (10th Cir. 1995) (refusal of Kosher diet
does not violate the Act).
42. Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusal to provide full
Pentecostal services does not constitute substantial burden).
43. Ingalls v. Florio, 968 F. Supp. 193 (D.N.J. 1997) (rationing inmate
opportunity to attend religious services does not violate the Act).
44. Rojas v. Cambra, No. C96-2990 VRW, 1997 WL 294409 (N.D. Cal.
May 20, 1997) (obligation to identify self and others as gang members as
condition of release from administrative segregation does not constitute
substantial burden).
45. Collins v. Scott, 961 F. Supp. .1009 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (strip search
and use of force on Muslim inmate does not constitute substantial burden).
46. Franklin v. District of Columbia, 960 F. Supp. 394 (D.D.C. 1997)
(failure to provide Spanish-speaking staff to Spanish-speaking inmates does not
constitute substantial burden).
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47. Williams v. Muhammad, No. 96 C- 4291, 1997 WL 136270 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 20, 1997) (refusal to release religious cassette tapes to inmate does not
constitute substantial burden).
48. Davie v. Wingard, 958 F. Supp. 1244 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (prison
grooming policy is least restrictive means to achieve compelling state interest).
49. Abdul-Malik v. Goord, No. 96 CIV. 1021-DLC, 1997 WL 83402
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997) (failure to provide Muslim inmates with Halal meat
does not constitute substantial burden).
50. Austin v. Guarini, No. 95-5447, 1997 WL 47566 (E.D. Pa., Feb. 3,
1997) (discriminatory requirement of request form to attend religious service
and arbitrary removal of name from list of those so requesting do not constitute
substantial burden).
51. Gholson v. Murry, 953 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Va. 1997) (prison transfer
and its impact on inmate diet does not constitute substantial burden)
52. Jones v. Roth, 950 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (refusal to
accommodate particular needs of Muslim prisoner with respect to Ramadan is
least restrictive means to achieve compelling state interest).
53. Africa v. Vaughn, No. CIV 96-649, 1996 WL 677515 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
21, 1996) (denial of visitation rights for spouse of inmate who was segregated
for tuberculosis serves compelling governmental interest).
54. Counts v. Newhart, 951 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Va. 1996) (denial of
request for particular religious service does not violate Act), aff'd without op.,
116 F.3d 1473 (4th Cir. 1997).
55. Metheney v. Anderson, 953 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ohio 1996)
(confiscation of inmate's religious materials concerning Aryan Nation does not
constitute substantial burden).
56. Manley v. Fordice, 945 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (prohibition
against use of television and radios does not constitute substantial burden),
aff'd. by 132 F.3d 1455 (5th Cir. 1997).
57. Jenkins v. Angelone, 948 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Va. 1996) (refusal to
accommodate dietary and other religious needs of African Hebrew Israelite
does not violate the Act).
58. Clark v. Stotts, No. 93-3258- DES, 1996 WL 583454 (D. Kan. Sept.
9, 1996) (prohibition on head gear does not constitute substantial burden).
59. Turner-Bey v. Lee, 935 F. Supp. 702 (D. Md. 1996) (removal of
crown from inmate does not constitute substantial burden).
60. Emel v. Mensinger, No. CIV.A. 95-5197, 1996 WL 468673 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 15, 1996) (prohibition on burning candles or paper during prayer does
not constitute substantial burden and in any event achieves compelling
interest).
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61. Owen v. Horsely, No. C-95-4516-EFL, 1996 WL 478960 (N.D. Cal.
Aug 9, 1996) (denial of Kosher diet during jail incarceration is related to
compelling governmental interest).
62. Cockrell-El v. District of Columbia, 937 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1996)
(inability to get to and from religious service without harassment does not
constitute substantial burden).
63. Karolis v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 935 F. Supp. 523 (D.N.J.
1996) (requiring Christian Scientist to submit to tuberculosis screening is least
restrictive means to achieve compelling state interest).
64. Reese v. Coughlin, No. 93 CIV 4748LAP, 1996 WL 374166
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1996) (denial of tarot cards and pentagram to Wiccan inmate
does not constitute substantial burden).
65. Watson v. Ivester, No. 4:95 CV 588, DDN, 1996 WL 288994 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 19, 1996) (order from corrections officer not to pray does not
constitute substantial burden).
66. Lucero v. Hensley, 920 F. Supp. 1067 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (refusal of
animal skins and Native American spiritual leader do not constitute substantial
burden).
67. Abdul-Akbar v. Department of Corrections, 910 F. Supp. 986 (D.
Del. 1995) (refusal of permission to wear Kufi does not constitute substantial
burden), affd without op., 111 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
144 (1997).
68. Muhammad v. New York Dept. of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 161
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (refusal to provide Nation of Islam with chaplains, religious
services, texts, and holiday accommodations does not constitute substantial
burden).
69. Crosley-El v. Berge, 896 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (refusal to
supply religious services for Moorish prisoner does not constitute substantial
burden).
70. Ishmawiyl v. Vaughn, No. CIV. A. 94-7544, 1995 WL 461949 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 1, 1995) (requiring inmate's mother to lift facial veil in presence of
male non-family members, as condition of visitation, is least restrictive means
of achieving a compelling state interest).
71. Reimann v. Murphy, 897 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (refusal to
deliver religious newspaper, published by Church of the Creator, to inmate
does not constitute substantial burden and is least restrictive means for
achieving compelling state interest).
72. George v. Sullivan, 896 F. Supp. 895 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (denial of
access to religiously oriented reading materials is least restrictive means of
achieving compelling state interest).
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73. Rhinehart v. Gomez, No. 93-Civ. 3747, 1995 WL 364339 (N.D. Cal.
June 8, 1995) (compulsory tuberculosis test performed on Muslim inmate does
not constitute substantial burden).
74. Best v. Kelly, 879 F. Supp. 305 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (removal of
prisoner from alternative diet, denial of his right to attend the Jewish congrega-
tion services, and refusal of his right to wear yarmulke does not constitute
substantial burden and is least restrictive means to achieve compelling state
interest).
75. Phipps v. Parker, 879 F. Supp. 734 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (requiring
claimed Orthodox Hasidic Jew to cut his hair short is least restrictive means to
compelling governmental interest).
76. Loden v. Peters, No. 92 C.20209, 1995 WL 89951 (N.D. I11. Mar. 1,
1995) (prohibition on inmate's worshiping in the nude and withholding of
spiritual documents he received in the mail do not constitute substantial burden
and are least restrictive means to achieve compelling governmental interest).
77. Davidson v. Davis, No. Civ. 4040 (SWK), 1995 WL 60732
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1995) (denial of access to Jewish chaplain does not
constitute substantial burden).
78. Woods v. Evatt, 876 F. Supp. 756 (D.S.C. 1995) (refusal to
accommodate Muslim faith equivalently to accommodations made to Christian
faith does not constitute substantial burden), aff'd by, 68 F.3d 463 (4th Cir.
1995).
79. Robinson v. Klotz, No. CIV. A. 94-1993, 1995 WL 27479 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 23, 1995) (loss of opportunity to pursue faith to inmate in administrative
segregation does not constitute substantial burden).
80. Boone v. Commissioner of Prisons, No. CIV. A. 93-5074, 1994 WL
383590 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1994) (confiscation of documents and fifteen-day
cell restriction did not constitute substantial burden).
81. Allah v. Beyer, No. Civ. 92-0651 (GEB),1994 WL 549614 (D.N.J.
Mar. 29, 1994) (interstate transfer of inmate is least restrictive means of
accomplishing compelling governmental interest).
82. Sardon v. Romero, No. 95C. 5084, 1997 WL 285496 (N.D. Ill. May
21, 1997) (refusal to allow inmate to receive certain religious materials does
not constitute substantial burden).
83. Williams v. Roberts, No. 96C. 4290, 1997 WL 136268 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 20, 1997) (failure to receive Jehovah's Witness publications does not
constitute substantial burden).
84. United States v. Marks, 947 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (state has
compelling interest in refusing to release from jail an inmate who wished to
participate in religious ritual commemorating his mother's death).
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85. Eskew v. Baker, No. Civ. N-94-2822, 1996 WL 807889 (D. Md.
May 2, 1996) (withholding inmate's Ku Klux Klan newspaper does not
constitute substantial burden).
III. STATE COURTS-NON-PRISON CLAIMS
A. Relief Under RFRA Granted (Including Preliminary Relief)
1. Horen v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 735, 479 S.E.2d 553 (1997)
(statute criminalizing possession of wild bird feathers and parts, as applied to
Native American couple, violates RFRA).
2. State v. Singh, No. C-950777, 1996 WL 932930 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
31, 1996) (statute criminalizing the carrying of concealed weapons, as applied
to member of Sikh religion carrying kirpan, or symbolic sword, sheathed and
sewn fast to the waistband of his undergarment violates RFRA).
3. The Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd., 215 Mich. App. 54,
544 N.W.2d 698 (1996) (zoning board's refusal to permit church to operate
homeless shelter as an "accessory use" violates RFRA).
4. Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 209 Mich. App.
630, 532 N.W.2d 195, (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (RFRA bars application of anti-
religious discrimination provision in state civil rights law).
5. State v. Miller, 196 Wis. 2d 238, 538 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995) (RFRA, and state constitution, prohibit application to members of the
Old Order Amish of state law requiring display of red and orange triangular
slow-moving vehicle emblem on horse-drawn buggies).
6. Hunt v. Hunt, 162 Vt. 423, 648 A.2d 843 (1994) (father who has
failed for religious reasons to pay child support may be held to the support
order, but RFRA precludes contempt order and incarceration for nonpayment).
7. Fence v. Jackson County, 135 Or. App. 574, 900 P.2d 524 (1995)
(County's prohibition of "outdoor mass gatherings," as applied to Native
American ceremonies, violates RFRA).
B. Relief Under RFRA Denied
1. Gallo v. Salesian Soc., Inc., 290 N.J. Super. 616, 676 A.2d 580
(Super Ct. App. Div. 1996) (application of state law prohibiting age and gender
discrimination to Catholic high school does not constitute substantial burden).
2. Adoption of Brooke, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 680, 679 N.E.2d 569 (1997)
(placement of child for adoption in non-Christian home, despite request to the
contrary by Catholic biological mother, does not constitute substantial burden
and accomplishes compelling interest), review denied, 425 Mass. 1105 (1997).
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3. Jasniowski v. Rushing, 287 Ill. App. 3d 655, 678 N.E.2d 743 (1997)
(prohibition on discrimination against unmarried cohabitants, as applied to
lessor who wished to discriminate for religiously motivated reasons, is least
restrictive means to achieve compelling interest), vacated, 174 I11. 2d 563, 685
N.E.2d 623 (1997) (post-Boerne).
4. People v. Peck, 52 Cal. App. 4th 351, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1996)
(prohibition's on transportation and possession of marijuana do not constitute
substantial burden on defendant's religion), review denied, 1997 Cal. LEXIS
1795 (Cal. Mar. 26, 1997).
5. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277, 690 A.2d 195 (1997)
(requiring Roman Catholic Diocese to comply with defendant's subpoena in
criminal case is least restrictive means to accomplish compelling governmental
interest).
6. Moran v. Moran, 188 Ariz. 139, 933 P.2d 1207 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1996) (obligation to obtain marriage license to legitimate marriage does not
constitute substantial burden), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 78 (1997).
7. South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Ass'n. v. St. Teresa of the Infant
Jesus Church Elementary Sch., 290 N.J. Super. 359, 675 A.2d 1155 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1996) (application of state collective bargaining law to Catholic
elementary school achieves compelling governmental interest), aff'd by, 150
N.J. 575, 696 A.2d 709, (1997).
8. Smith v. Fair Emp. & Housing Comm'n., 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 913 P.2d
909, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (1996) (application of state law prohibiting
discrimination based on marital status does not constitute substantial burden on
landlord who wishes to so discriminate for religious reasons), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2531 (1997).
9. Blandino v. State, 112 Nev. 352, 914 P.2d 624 (1996) (requiring
counsel on direct appeal from criminal conviction does not constitute
substantial burden), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 208 (1996).
10. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska
1993) (compelling state interest supports application of prohibition on housing
discrimination based on marital status to broker who wishes to discriminate for
religious reasons), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 979 (1994).
11. Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d
159, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (App. Div. 1997) (RFRA does not insulate Diocese
against suit for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of priest), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 413 (1997).
12. State v. Bontrager, No. 6-95-17, 1996 WL 612374 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996) (RFRA does not preclude requiring member of Old Order Amish to wear
orange clothing while hunting).
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IV. STATE COURTS- PRISON CLAIMS
A. Relief under RFRA Granted (Including Preliminary Relief)
None
B. Relief under RFRA Denied
1. Bartley v. Mamoulides, 694 So. 2d 1050 (La. Ct. App. 1997)
(refusing inmate's petition for name change on religious grounds does not
constitute substantial burden).
2. Abdur-Ra'oof v. Department of Corrections, 221 Mich. App. 585,
562 N.W.2d 251 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (forbidding inmates from leaving work
assignments to attend Friday Muslim services does not constitute substantial
burden).
3. Akbar-el v. Muhammed, 105 Ohio App. 3d 81, 663 N.E.2d 703
(1995) (denying inmate a worship service apart from the general Islamic
worship service and a right to wear a "fez" rather than a "tarbush" did not
constitute substantial burden), dismissing appeal, 74 Ohio St. 3d 1456, 656
N.E.2d 950 (1995) (discretionary appeal not allowed).
4. Schuch v. Rogers, 113 Ohio App. 3d 718, 681 N.E.2d 1388, (1996)
(denial of religious paraphernalia to Native American inmates does not
constitute substantial burden).
5. Winters v. State, 549 N.W.2d 819 (Iowa 1996) (disciplining white
inmate's refusal, on religious grounds, to share cell with black inmate does not
constitute substantial burden).
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